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of the good faith for value defense under section 550(b)(1) in the Ninth Circuit, which includes
California. Part IV explores the distinction between the Second and Ninth Circuits’ interpretation
and application of the good faith for value defense under section 550(b)(1).
Discussion
I.

The Bankruptcy Code’s Subsequent Transferee’s Good Faith for Value Defense
Section 550(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides the affirmative “good faith for value”

defense, which is only applicable to subsequent transferees to assert when a trustee is attempting
to recover an avoidable transfer from the “initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for
whose benefit such transfer was made” under section 548.3 A subsequent transferee satisfies the
good faith for value defense against a trustee claiming “actual intent” fraudulent transfer when
three elements are met.4 The good faith for value defense may be applied when the subsequent
transferee demonstrates the transfer was: (1) in good faith, (2) accepted for value, and (3)
without the knowledge of the transfer’s voidability.5 However, if a subsequent transferee fails to
satisfy the good faith for value defense, a trustee may recover against the transferee.6
The Bankruptcy Code does not provide definitions for each element of the good faith for
value defense, and the Second and Ninth Circuits interpret the standards differently.7
Consequently, this has established differing standards the subsequent transferee must meet based
on which circuit the case was filed.8 The Second and Ninth Circuits have interpreted the
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11 U.S.C. §550(a)(1)–(2).
Id.
5
11 U.S.C. §550(b)(1); In re Enron Corp., 333 B.R. 205, 234 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005); Abele v. Mod. Fin. Plans
Servs., Inc. (In re Cohen), 300 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2002).
6
11 U.S.C. §550(b)(1).
7
Id.
8
Compare Banner v. Kassow, 104 F.3d 352 (2d Cir. 1996) (applying subjective good faith standard considering
circumstances surrounding transferee’s actions) with Hayes v. Palm Seedlings Partners-A (In re Agric. Rsch. &
Tech. Grp, Inc.), 916 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying objective good faith standard whether transferee knew or
should have known of voidability).
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elements of “good faith” and “knowledge” differently, leaving courts in each circuit to interpret
their meanings under section 550(b)(1) as what it deems “more correct.”9
II.

Second Circuit’s Analysis and Application of Good Faith for Value Defense
Standard
A. Good Faith Standard
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has concluded that good faith

is not satisfied when the subsequent transferee has “‘sufficient knowledge [of the circumstances
surrounding the transfer] to place him on inquiry notice of the debtor’s possible insolvency.’”10
According to the Second Circuit, good faith is lacking when a subsequent transferee chooses to
intentionally ignore “red flags,” which suggests fraudulent activity.11
In In re Goldberg, a Connecticut bankruptcy court employed the good faith standard set
forth by the Second Circuit In re Bernard L. Madoff and found that the transferee had not
satisfied this standard.12 The Goldberg Court analyzed whether the transferee had sufficient
knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the transfer.13 In this case, the Goldbergs (the
“Debtors”) operated a Ponzi scheme for twelve years, during which the transferee (the
“Transferee”), an experienced real estate developer, invested $300,000.00 into the Debtors’
scheme.14 Prior to investing, the Transferee spoke with his son, Scott LaBonte, who had
suggested the transfer to the Debtors’ scheme and had learned the Debtors were using investor
funds to purchase and resell foreclosed properties while providing twenty percent profit back to
its investors.15 However, the Transferee failed to conduct any due diligence whatsoever despite
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In re BR Festivals, LLC, No. 14-10175, 2014 WL 6846249, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2014).
Banner, 104 F.3d at 352.
11
In re Bernard L. Madoff, 608 B.R. 181, 196 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019).
12
In re Goldberg, 623 B.R. 225, 240 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2020).
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Id.
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Id. at 233.
15
Id. at 238.
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his extensive background and knowledge in real estate development.16 Upon the Debtors filing
for bankruptcy, the Transferee sought to assert a good faith for value defense against the
trustee.17 The Connecticut bankruptcy court, however, found that because the Transferee knew
about the Debtors’ scheme, the transferee was on sufficient notice of the Debtors’ possible
fraudulent nature.18 Further, the Transferee was aware of other individuals’ concerns about the
Debtors’ business and ignored the numerous red flags.19 Because the Transferee failed to inquire
about the business and did not investigate any documents, the bankruptcy court concluded that
the Transferee did not act in good faith.20
B. Standard for Whether the Transfer was Accepted “For Value”
The Second Circuit’s interpretation of the term “for value,” looks to what the transferee
gave up as opposed to what the debtor received.21 Bankruptcy courts in the Second Circuit have
held that “value” need not be a reasonably equivalent value but is met by consideration sufficient
to support a simple contract.22
Using this standard, in In re Colmark I Ltd. P'ship, the Connecticut bankruptcy court
found that the defendant’s acceptance of a $250,000 check for legal services to assist plaintiff
with a possible bankruptcy filing was sufficient to satisfy the “for value” element.23 Moreover,
the court concluded that because the defendant provided services to the plaintiff, “value to the
transfer is sufficient.”24 Similarly, in In re Bernard L. Madoff, the Southern District of New
York, implementing the Second Circuit’s interpretation that “for value” is satisfied by monetary
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Id. at 234.
Id.
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Id. at 238.
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Id.
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Id. at 239.
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11 U.S.C. §550(b)(1); In re Colmark I Ltd. P'ship, 189 B.R. 253, 257 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1995).
22
In re Bernard L. Madoff, 608 B.R. 181, 195 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019).
23
189 B.R. at 257.
24
Id.
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American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review | St. John’s School of Law, 8000 Utopia Parkway, Queens, NY 11439

consideration, found that value was satisfied when defendants loaned $300 million for an
investment, which the transferee repaid through loans to the subsequent transferee.25 These
independent monthly loan payments satisfied the “for value” standard despite being significantly
less than the initial $300 million payment.26
C. Standard for Without “Knowledge” of the Voidability of the Transfer
In the Second Circuit, courts consider the “good faith” and “knowledge” elements of the
good faith for value defense simultaneously.27 To satisfy the knowledge of the voidability of the
transfer element, a court does not require the transferee to have complete understanding of the
facts to constitute knowledge.28 Rather, if a transferee has lesser knowledge of the voidability of
the transfer, but has knowledge nonetheless, the transferee will be found to have had
knowledge.29 Additionally, because the Bankruptcy Code does not define “knowledge,” there is
further ambiguity regarding the level of knowledge necessary to satisfy this element.30 The
United States District Court for Southern District of New York, in In re Thakur, considered the
Second Circuit’s holding in Banner v. Kassow, stating that “‘if a transferee possesses knowledge
of facts that suggest a transfer may be fraudulent,’ he has sufficient knowledge to preclude his
incantation of §550(b)’s defense.”31
The Thakur Court found that because the transferee was aware that the debtor had
transferred the property only seven weeks before the scheduled closing to a corporate entity,
which suggested fraud, the subsequent transferee had some knowledge of the voidability.32 The
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608 B.R. at 195.
Id.
27
In re Thakur, 498 B.R. 410, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. (quoting Banner, 104 F.3d at 352).
32
Id. at 421.
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court further concluded that the transferee’s knowledge that the debtor had financial difficulties
which was corroborated by their email correspondence, further supported a finding that the
transferee failed to satisfy the good faith for value defense.33
III.

Ninth Circuit’s Analysis and Application of Good Faith for Value Defense Standard

A. Good Faith Standard
Distinguishable from the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the good faith for value
defense, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit adopted an objective standard
of how to determine whether a subsequent transferee was acting in good faith.34 The Ninth
Circuit analyzed what the “transferee objectively ‘knew or should have known’ in questions of
good faith, rather than examining what the transferee actually knew from a subjective
standpoint.”35 Similarly, the Nevada bankruptcy court, which sits in the Ninth Circuit, applied
this same objective standard finding that if a subsequent transferee has knowledge of the
transferor’s or debtor’s insolvency, particularly where the transferee neglected to further inquire
with reasonable diligence, the transferee may be unable to claim he acted in good faith.36
The Ninth Circuit in Hayes, applying this objective standard of “good faith,” found that
the transferee did not act in good faith when he received a transfer in high excess of the value he
exchanged for it and also stated that the transfers would induce new investment.37 The Ninth
Circuit declared that the subsequent transferee should have known that the transfer was
fraudulent, set off by the exchange of grossly disproportionate transfers.38 The court further
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Id.
Hayes v. Palm Seedlings Partners-A (In re Agric. Rsch. & Tech. Grp, Inc.), 916 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1990).
35
Id.
36
In re Nat’l Audit Def. Network, 367 B.R. 207, 223 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2007).
37
Hayes, 916 F.2d at 539.
38
Id.
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added that the facts strongly suggest that the transferee not only knew of the fraud, but likely
participated in it, and thus could not prevail under a good faith for value defense.39
B. Standard for Whether the Transfer was Accepted for Value
Courts in the Ninth Circuit have agreed that the “for value” element need not be the
precise value exchanged. Specifically, courts in the Ninth Circuit have interpreted value to mean
reasonably equivalent value, rejecting the Eighth Circuit’s suggestion that value is satisfied only
with an amount equivalent to the fair market value.40 According to a California bankruptcy court,
reasonably equivalent value “balances the interests of the creditors against those of innocent
third parties, provides receipt of something more than that which is sufficient to support a
contract … and leaves the court with some latitude to apply a flexible . . . standard.”41 In 2014, a
California bankruptcy court reconsidered the “for value” standard, noting Laguna Beach’s
finding, and concluded that it need not rule on the standard.42 The BR Festivals Court did note,
however, that the more correct standard for value “is merely consideration sufficient to support a
simple contract.”43
The California bankruptcy court in Laguna Beach analyzed that because the defendant
received $200,000 for the right to purchase the option, but failed to transfer anything in return,
the reasonably equivalent standard of “for value” was not satisfied.44 This was further evidenced
by the transferee neglecting to fulfill his further obligations once the payment was received.45

39

Id.
In re Laguna Beach Motors, Inc., 159 B.R. 562, 568 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1993).
41
Id.
42
In re BR Festivals, LLC, No. 14-10175, 2014 WL 6846249, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2014).
43
Id.
44
In re Laguna Beach Motors, Inc., 159 B.R. at 568.
45
Id. at 569.
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C. Standard for Without “Knowledge” of the Voidability of the Transfer
The Ninth Circuit’s standard for the “knowledge” of voidability of the transfer element
does not require that the subsequent transferee have actual knowledge of the voidability of the
transfer.46 Rather, the Ninth Circuit requires a finding that the transferee “ha[s] knowledge of
sufficient facts that: (1) puts the transferee on notice that the transfer might be avoidable, or (2)
requires further inquiry into the situation and such inquiry is likely to lead to the conclusion that
the transfer might be avoidable.”47
The California bankruptcy court, in In re Richmond Produce Co., Inc., found that the
transferee, in asserting a good faith for value defense, failed to prove it acted without knowledge
of the voidability of the transfer because it had some knowledge of the sale and intended to use
those details to leverage its own purchase of stock.48 Further, the transferee’s defense failed
because it was on notice that the transaction may have been fraudulent due to the debtor’s
financial issues and the leveraging of the buyout stock.49 Thus, even if the transferee did not have
actual knowledge of the voidability of the transfer, it should have conducted further inquiry.50
Not doing so is equivalent to turning a blind eye and is insufficient to satisfy the good faith for
value defense under section 550(b)(1).51
IV.

Distinctions in Application of Good Faith for Value Defense

The Second and Ninth Circuit apply different standards of “good faith” in the good faith
for value defense. The Ninth Circuit applies a strict objective standard whereas the Second
Circuit allows for circumstances surrounding the transfer to contribute to whether the transferee

46

In re Richmond Produce Co., Inc., 195 B.R. 455, 464 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
In re Goodwin, 115 B.R. 674, 677 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.1990).
48
195 B.R. at 460–61.
49
Id. at 464.
50
Id.
51
Id.
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acted in good faith.52 Considering the circumstances surrounding the transfer, Second Circuit
courts have considered whether “red flags” have been ignored by the transferee resulting in
willful blindness akin to bad faith.53
The Second Circuit, like the majority of circuits, claim subsequent transferees can satisfy
“for value” with consideration sufficient to support a simple contract.54 The Ninth Circuit’s
application of “for value” considers a “reasonably equivalent” standard.55 However, a court in
the Ninth Circuit has stated, but has not adopted, that the simple contract for value is the more
appropriate standard.56 Lastly, both Second and Ninth Circuit courts agree that knowledge is met
if the transferee has knowledge suggesting fraud.57 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit does not
require proof of actual knowledge. Similarly, the Second Circuit determined sufficient
knowledge does not require the transferee to have a complete understanding of the facts.58
Conclusion
The Second Circuit and Ninth Circuit approaches to the good faith for value defense have
different standards for satisfying the element of “good faith.” Because determining if one acts in
good faith requires a fact intensive analysis, courts employ the approaches already developed
within their respective circuit.59 Thus, depending on whether a subsequent transferee asserts its

52

Compare Hayes v. Palm Seedlings Partners-A (In re Agric. Rsch. & Tech. Grp, Inc.), 916 F.2d 528 (9th Cir.
1990) with Banner v. Kassow, 104 F.3d 352 (2d Cir. 1996).
53
In re Bernard L. Madoff, 608 B.R. 181, 196 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019).
54
Id. at 195.
55
See In re Laguna Beach Motors, Inc., 159 B.R. 562, 568 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1993).
56
See In re BR Festivals, LLC, No. 14-10175, 2014 WL 6846249, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2014).
57
See In re Thakur, 498 B.R. 410, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).; In re Richmond Produce Co., Inc., 195 B.R. 455, 464
(N.D. Cal. 1996).
58
Id.
59
See In re Petters Co., Inc., 562 B.R. 391 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2016), In re Seitz, 400 B.R. 707 (Bankr. E.D. Mo.
2008).
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good faith for value defense in the Second or Ninth Circuit, different standards of proof for
“good faith” will be required.60

60

In re Sherman, 67 F.3d 1348, 1355 (8th Cir. 1995).
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